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There is a long-standing and ongoing debate about the advantages and 
disadvantages of various democratic regimes types. Is presidentialism inherently 
perilous? Is parliamentarism unequivocally virtuous? These questions were 
highly salient during the early 1990s at the time of the third wave of 
democratisation. However, they remain important to this day. In very recent 
times democratising countries, including Afghanistan, Timor Leste and Iraq, 
have faced or are still facing tough constitutional choices in this regard. 
Moreover, a number of established democracies, including Mexico and Taiwan, 
are currently debating whether or not to change their basic system of 
government. In the academic contributions to these debates most attention has 
focussed on the relative advantages and disadvantages of presidentialism and 
parliamentarism. In all probability, Linz’s judgment that, all else equal, 
parliamentarism should be chosen above presidentialism still represents the 
consensus view.i That said, there is a powerful counter-argument that properly-
crafted presidential regimes can exhibit advantages for certain countries.ii 
 In this debate, work on semi-presidentialism has been notable for its 
(near) absence. To this day, semi-presidentialism – the situation where there is 
both a directly-elected president and a prime minister responsible to the 
legislature - has been the focus of only one book-length study and scarcely more 
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journal articles.iii And yet, semi-presidentialism remains a very popular choice of 
government, especially for countries that democratised during the third wave or 
that have done so subsequently. Indeed, in the ex-communist countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union there are twice as many 
semi-presidential regimes as presidential and parliamentary regimes combined. 
From an academic point of view, the popularity of semi-presidentialism is 
somewhat alarming. Semi-presidentialism is now widespread and yet to the 
extent that people have theorised the concept they have overwhelmingly 
concluded that it should be avoided. In this regard, Linz’s judgment can still be 
treated as the received academic wisdom on the subject. He stated: “In view of 
some of the experiences with this type of system it seems dubious to argue that 
in and by itself it can generate democratic stability”.iv Specifically, he argued that 
semi-presidentialism tends to be associated either with “politicking and intrigues 
that may delay decision making and lead to contradictory policies due to the 
struggle between the president and the prime minister” or to “an authoritarian 
interpretation of the powers of the president”.v Valenzuela and Lijphart have 
recently agreed with Linz’s judgment.vi 
 Given the popularity of semi-presidentialism, the absence of work on this 
form of government is puzzling. In fact, it is more than just puzzling. One of the 
key characteristics of semi-presidentialism is that countries working within this 
basic constitutional framework operate in many different ways. There are semi-
presidential countries with strong presidents and subservient heads of 
government. Guyana is a case in point. At the same time, there are semi-
presidential countries with strong prime ministers and figurehead presidents. 
Slovenia is an example. Finally, there are semi-presidential countries with a 
balance of presidential and prime ministerial powers. Mongolia is one such 
country. Given this situation, the experience of semi-presidentialism has the 
capacity to teach us not only about this form of government, but also about the 
impact of presidentialism and parliamentarism too. In short, all else equal, we 
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should expect to find that highly presidentialised semi-presidential countries will 
have difficulty in ensuring the survival of democracy. By contrast, semi-
presidential countries with symbolic presidents will be most likely to 
democratize successfully. For their part, semi-presidential countries with a 
balance of presidential and prime ministerial powers will be problematic and 
will not be particularly conducive to democracy. 
 This paper examines the theory and practice of semi-presidentialism. It 
provides a definition of the term and identifies the set of semi-presidential 
countries in the world. More specifically, it aims to isolate the independent 
impact of semi-presidentialism on democratic performance. The conclusion is 
that countries should avoid highly presidentialised semi-presidential systems. By 
contrast, semi-presidential systems with ceremonial presidents and strong prime 
ministers have performed well. In the case of balanced semi-presidentialism, the 
situation is more complex. Many such countries have democratized successfully 
and their record is certainly better than highly presidentialised semi-presidential 
systems. However, the evidence suggests that they have done so despite the 
institutional crises caused by this particular form of semi-presidentialism. So, 
while a balanced form of semi-presidentialism may be a perfectly good choice of 
constitutional framework for a consolidated democracy, it is a risky choice for 
newly-democratising regimes. 
 
Semi-presidentialism: what is it and where is it found? 
 
The concept of semi-presidentialism has been defined in a number of ways. 
Maurice Duverger, the person who first popularised the term, stated that: 
[a] political regime is considered as semi-presidential if the 
constitution which established it combines three elements: (1) the 
president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage; (2) he 
possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, 
however, a prime minister and ministers who possess executive 
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and governmental power and can stay in office only if the 
parliament does not show its opposition to them.vii 
The problem with this definition is the second criterion. Who is to decide what 
constitutes a president with “quite considerable powers”? The answer is that 
every writer has the opportunity to decide subjectively what powers are 
sufficient for them to count as “quite considerable”. As a result, the set of semi-
presidential countries has varied from one writer to the next. For Duverger, there 
were six West European semi-presidential regimes: Austria, Finland, France, 
Iceland, Ireland and Portugal. And this is despite the fact that the Austrian, 
Icelandic and Irish presidents were largely symbolic leaders. For others, the 
weakness of these three presidents meant that these countries and others like 
them should not be classed as semi-presidential at all. For example, Stepan and 
Skach identified only two West European countries as semi-presidential - France 
and Portugal - and classified Austria, Iceland and Ireland as parliamentary 
because they have weak presidents, even though all three are directly elected.viii 
The consequence of this situation is more than simply semantic. By 
introducing a fundamental subjectivity into the definition of the term, the 
operationalisation of the concept becomes problematic. In short, it leads to the 
situation where people disagree as to the set of semi-presidential countries. As a 
result, they often fail to compare like with like. For example, if we adopt a strict 
definition of “quite considerable powers” and count only those countries with 
strong presidents as semi-presidential, then it is not surprising that we should 
conclude that semi-presidentialism is inherently likely to encourage a conflict of 
power within the executive itself. It does so because we have only included 
countries that are ever likely to experience this problem in the set of semi-
presidential regimes that we are considering. By contrast, if we adopt a less strict 
definition and count countries such as Austria, Iceland and Ireland as semi-
presidential, then we would not be in a position to conclude that semi-
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presidentialism creates an inherent tension within the executive. They may do so, 
but only in some circumstances that we would then need to specify. 
 Elsewhere, I have argued that the solution to this problem is to drop the 
second criterion from Duverger’s definition.ix For me, a semi-presidential regime 
is simply one where there is the combination of a directly elected, fixed-term 
president and a prime minister who is responsible to the legislature. This 
definition makes it much easier to arrive at an agreed set of semi-presidential 
countries and, thus, maximizes the opportunity for authors to compare like with 
like. True, this definition does not totally eliminate all subjectivity when it comes 
to determining the set of semi-presidential countries. For example, in Bosnia-
Herzogovina there are three directly elected presidents. Following the elections, 
the chair of the presidency is chosen first by a majority of the presidents, then 
parliament decides the rotation between the remaining two presidents.x In this 
highly unusual case, a judgment call must be made. Is Bosnia-Herzogovina a 
semi-presidential regime or not? To me, we should probably not count Bosnia-
Herzogovina as semi-presidential, because the system deviates far from the 
definition of semi-presidentialism as the situation where there is a single directly 
elected president. Others, though, may make a different call. Equally, in Slovakia 
and Iceland the president may be removed from office by a plebiscite. Thus, the 
president is not necessarily guaranteed to remain in office for a fixed-term. In 
this case, I think we should still class these two countries as semi-presidential 
because a super-majority is needed in the plebiscite and because the president is 
not simply responsible to a potentially fickle majority in parliament in the same 
way as the prime minister. Thus, the status of the president in these countries is 
very similar to the situation in other semi-presidential countries. In effect, they 
serve for a fixed term. Overall, even though the revised definition of semi-
presidentialism does not totally eliminate all subjectivity in determining the set 
of semi-presidential countries, it drastically reduces the number of judgment 
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calls that have to be made. In this way, it maximises the potential for writers to 
compare like with like. 
 Working with this revised definition, there would currently appear to be 
54 semi-presidential countries in the world. (See Table 1). Of these countries, 23 
were classed as Free by Freedom House and 31 were classed as either Partly Free 
or Not Free. By the same token, 31 were classed as Electoral Democracies, while 
23 did not have this status. Thus, the first observation to make is that semi-
presidentialism would not appear to be an inherently problematic regime type as 
regards democratic survival. A good number of semi-presidential countries are 
Free, even if the majority of semi-presidential countries are either Partly Free or 
Not Free. Moreover, even though a large number of semi-presidential countries 
are not Electoral Democracies, an even greater number are. 
 That said, we need to explore the world of semi-presidentialism more 
closely before we can make definitive judgments about whether or not it is 
conducive to democracy. In short, there is a wide variety of political practice 
within the set of semi-presidential countries. As a result, rather than making 
judgments about the performance of semi-presidentialism as a whole, we need to 
examine the performance of the various types of semi-presidentialism that occur 
throughout the world.xi As we shall see, some semi-presidential countries have 
very strong presidents and weak prime ministers. Others have strong prime 
ministers and figurehead presidents. Yet others have systems where there is 
more or less a balance of presidential and prime ministerial powers. What 
difference does the form of political practice make to the democratic success or 
failure of semi-presidential countries? On the basis of the work of people like 
Linz, we should expect to find that highly presidentialised semi-presidential 
countries are problematic; that semi-presidential countries with ceremonial 
presidents and strong prime ministers should be successful because they operate 
in a parliamentary-like way; and that semi-presidential countries where there is a 
balance of power within the executive should also be problematic because there 
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will exhibit destabilizing institutional conflict. In the next sections, we explore 
whether these expectations are born out. 
Table 1 about here 
 
Highly presidentialised semi-presidential countries 
 
In their overview of his work, Mainwaring and Shugart argued that Linz 
identified five general problems with presidentialism: the executive and 
legislature have competing claims to legitimacy; the fixed terms of office make 
presidential regimes more rigid than parliamentary systems; presidentialism 
encourages a winner-takes-all outcome; the style of presidential politics 
encourages presidents to be intolerant of political opposition; and 
presidentialism encourages populist candidates. Most of three points are salient 
when it comes to assessing the performance of highly presidentialised semi-
presidential countries. For example, as Lijphart notes, even though semi-
presidentialism has the potential to share power between a president from one 
party/coalition and a prime minister from an opposing party/coalition, the 
winner-takes-all nature of the presidential election remains under semi-
presidentialism.xii In a highly presidentialised semi-presidential system the 
winner-takes-all nature of the office may mean that a highly personalised system 
of presidential leadership emerges. This situation is likely to be harmful for 
democracy because the president may decide to flout the democratic process for 
reasons and/or interests of his own. In so doing, the president may come into 
conflict with the legislature whose members enjoy an alternative source of 
popular legitimacy. 
 In highly presidentialised semi-presidential systems democracy can and 
has survived, but it is not the norm. Of the 23 Free semi-presidential countries, 
only four have systems with strong presidents and weak prime ministers – 
Guyana, Namibia, Peru and South Korea.xiii The fact that these highly 
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presidentialised semi-presidential countries have survived is a sign that this type 
of system is not inherently problematic. Indeed, the Namibian case is particularly 
noteworthy as it is one of the few consolidated democracies in sub-Saharan 
Africa. That said, only a small number of Free semi-presidential countries 
operate in a highly presidentialised way. Moreover, these countries have faced 
some very difficult political situations and, arguably, these difficulties have been 
caused by or at least exacerbated by the highly presidentialised nature of their 
semi-presidential system. For example, writing about South Korea in a recent 
overview of Asian democratization, one writer has argued that even though 
“democracy advanced to democratic consolidation in terms of civilian 
supremacy, strengthened civil liberties and political rights, it has nonetheless 
serious deficits in horizontal accountability and the checks and balances of the 
presidency”.xiv In particular, the attempt by successive South Korean presidents 
to assert their powers has sometimes brought them into sharp conflict with the 
legislature, especially when the opposition has had a majority there. Thus, while 
the evidence suggests that the combination of semi-presidentialism with a very 
strong president and a weak prime minister is not always terminal for 
democracy, this form of semi-presidentialism does not have a particularly good 
track record and where it has survived it may done so despite the problems 
associated with this form of government. 
 In fact, more often than not highly presidentialised semi-presidential 
countries have tended to perform badly, bearing out the predictions of Linz and 
others. For example, a number of the most fragile semi-presidential democracies, 
meaning those that were not classed as Free but were classed as Electoral 
Democracies, have strong presidents and weak prime ministers, particularly 
Madagascar and Russia. In some cases, there is reason to believe that strength of 
the presidency was a contributory factor to their poor democratic performance. 
In this regard, Russia is perhaps the most notorious case. In 1993, President 
Yeltsin’s dissolution of the Duma sparked a constitutional and military crisis. 
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Moreover, the restoration of order was combined with a marked 
presidentialisation of the system. This process has been reinforced under 
President Putin. There is a case to be made that Russia may have performed even 
worse without strong leadership and over issues such as Chechnya the Russian 
population seems to have supported President Putin. All the same, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that the highly presidentialised form of semi-
presidentialism in Russia has played a part in the decline in the country’s 
democratic quality. 
 Worse still, the list of Partly Free and Not Free semi-presidential countries 
that are not Electoral Democracies features an even greater number of countries 
where the president has great powers and where the prime minister is a cipher. 
Of course, we have to be circumspect in concluding that the particular form of 
semi-presidentialism in these countries is responsible for their poor democratic 
performance. The authoritarian personalisation of the process may have occurred 
before the constitutionalisation of the system. So, for example, in many of the 
countries of the former Soviet Union, such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the choice of a highly presidentialised semi-
presidential system may just have been a reflection of existing authoritarian 
tendencies. As a result, it is difficult to argue that the problems of democratic 
consolidation in these countries were caused by the fact that they adopted a 
semi-presidential system in which the president had great power. The choice of 
system may have simply reflected existing authoritarian power relations. 
However, we can say that highly presidentialised semi-presidential systems offer 
little to alleviate the authoritarian tendencies with which the country is faced. 
The direct election of the president encourages the president to portray himself 
as the ‘father figure’ or saviour of the nation. There is an inherent emphasis on 
‘court politics’. The prime minister cannot act as any sort of check on the 
president. The system does little to prevent arbitrary presidential rule. 
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 Overall, the general situation in highly presidentialised semi-presidential 
countries tends to bear out the predictions of Linz and others. These systems do 
not necessarily prevent the consolidation of democracy as the examples of 
countries like Guyana and Namibia illustrate. However, they often create 
obstacles to it. Sometimes, they do so by reinforcing the inherent problems of the 
already highly personalized system. In other cases, they encourage the 
personalization of the system. For example, in Yemen the careful constitutional 
balance that was negotiated prior to the merger of North and South Yemen was 
undermined by the presidentialisation of the regime under President Salih. In 
short, the evidence suggests that nascent democracies should avoid adopting 
such systems. If this conclusion is correct, then Mozambique’s recent 
constitutional reform that strengthened the power of the presidency is 
potentially dangerous and may undermine the already fragile Electoral 
Democracy that exists there. By the same token, the Central African Republic has 
perhaps taken a gamble by adopting a semi-presidential system of this sort as 
part of its new constitution.  
 
Semi-presidential countries with ceremonial presidents 
 
Semi-presidential countries with ceremonial presidents operate in a 
parliamentary-like way. The president is a symbolic leader who has few 
constitutional powers and who acts as a figurehead for the country rather than as 
an active decision-maker. The real power lies with the prime minister who is in 
charge of all aspects of the day-to-day running of the country. To the extent that 
political practice in these semi-presidential countries closely resembles the 
practice in parliamentary countries with indirectly elected figurehead presidents 
and strong heads of government, such as in Germany and Greece, then we 
would expect their democratic performance to be good. In this type of semi-
presidential system, the direct election of the president may legitimize the office 
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and allow the incumbent to serve as a spokesperson for the country as a whole. 
However, the absence of presidential powers means that any such popular 
legitimacy is never directed against the prime minister and never serves to 
establish the president as a political competitor within the executive. 
 Only a small number of semi-presidential countries have figurehead 
presidents and strong prime ministers – Austria, Bulgaria, Iceland, Ireland, 
Portugal and Slovenia. What is noticeable about all of these countries is that they 
are classed as Free. Again, we have to be slightly careful not to draw an overly 
hasty conclusion about the apparent advantages of this form of semi-
presidentialism. In Portugal, the President had far greater powers in the period 
immediately following the transition to democracy in 1974. Arguably, therefore, 
this form of semi-presidentialism was only adopted when the democratic system 
was firmly established, so it was not a contributory factor in the country’s 
successful transition. The same is certainly true of Ireland and probably Iceland 
as well. In Ireland the directly elected figurehead presidency was introduced in 
1937 some 16 years after independence and 14 years after the end of the civil war. 
So, again, Ireland’s experience of this form of semi-presidentialism does not 
necessarily establish this type of system as a key factor in the country’s 
democratic success. 
 All the same, we can at least say that this type of semi-presidential system 
does not act as a hindrance to democracy. In this regard, the most interesting 
case is Slovenia. Here, the choice of the semi-presidential system was a 
compromise.xv At the time of the constitutional debate there was popular 
support for a directly elected president largely because of the popularity of the 
then president of the collective presidency of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, 
Milan Kucan. Aware of the fact that he would most likely win any direct election 
and mindful of his communist past, opposition parties wanted to establish an 
indirectly elected presidency, which Kucan would probably not have won. The 
resulting compromise was a system where the president was directly elected but 
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had few powers. This compromise was also consistent with the historical legacy 
of assembly-centred politics in Slovenia.xvi Once elected, Kucan did not try to 
exercise any more power than was allocated to the office in the constitution and, 
thus, set a precedent for a ceremonial presidency. Since this time there have been 
disputes over the precise role of the presidency, but there have been no 
damaging institutional deadlocks and the incumbent president has never tried to 
personalize the political process in a potentially destabilizing way. 
 Even this brief sketch of the Slovenian experience illustrates the basic and 
well-known problems with understanding the causes of democratic 
consolidation. The success or failure of democratization depends on so many 
variables that it is difficult to determine the extent to which the formal structure 
of the executive contributes in any way to the final outcome. At the very least, 
though, the Slovenian case tells us that a semi-presidential system where there is 
a figurehead president and a strong prime minister did not create any extra 
obstacles on the path to democratization. In such countries, and in contrast to the 
highly presidentialised semi-presidential systems considered previously, there is 
little opportunity for the president to try to personalize the system and probably 
less incentive to do so given the constitutional balance of power. If a particular 
leader did wish to personalize the system, then s/he would probably try to 
assume the prime ministership and govern from there, as was the case in the 
early years of the Slovakian parliamentary system prior to the reform of the 
constitution in 1999. However, a leader who tried to personalize this type of 
system may not find it easy to do so given the need for a parliamentary majority 
and sometimes a supermajority in order to pass major reforms. As a result, and 
consistent with both Linz’s expectations and Valenzuela’s recent 
recommendation,xvii there is at least some evidence to suggest that a semi-
presidential system with a figurehead presidency and a strong prime minister is 
certainly preferable to a highly presidentialised semi-presidential system. We 
have to be mindful of the fact that the number of relevant cases in this regard is 
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very small. Even so, to the extent that such systems operate in a parliamentary-
like way and that on balance these systems are usually considered to be less 
problematic, then this form of semi-presidential system is perhaps most likely to 
lead to a good democratic performance. 
 
Semi-presidential countries with a balance of presidential and prime 
ministerial powers 
 
The traditional critique of semi-presidentialism most often relates to countries 
where there is a balance of presidential and prime ministerial powers. Whereas 
presidentialism is often criticized for creating the potential for conflict between 
the executive and the legislature, semi-presidentialism is criticized for creating 
the potential for conflict within the executive itself. For example, as noted above, 
Linz argues that semi-presidentialism may be associated either with “politicking 
and intrigues that may delay decision making and lead to contradictory policies 
due to the struggle between the president and the prime minister”.xviii Equally, 
Stepan and Skach argue that semi-presidentialism “inherently entails the 
possibility of dead-locked government and constitutional conflict between the 
dual executive if voters do not produce majorities” and they go on to warn that 
in such situations semi-presidentialism may be dangerous for fragile 
democracies because the military may be encouraged to step in and break the 
constitutional deadlock.xix These problems may occur even when the president 
and prime minister are from the same political party or coalition. However, they 
are likely to be exacerbated when the president and prime minister are from 
opposing parties, i.e. during periods of political cohabitation. Overall, if these 
expectations are correct, then we will find that the record of semi-presidential 
countries with a balance of presidential and prime ministerial powers is poor. 
 In fact, the list of Free semi-presidential countries includes a considerable 
number that give significant powers to both the president and the prime minister 
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and that have experienced sometimes prolonged periods of political 
cohabitation. In some of these countries, the prime ministership is the main focus 
of decision-making responsibility, but the president has the opportunity for 
significant intervention either sporadically or in one or more discrete policy 
areas, usually foreign and/or defence policy. Such countries include Bulgaria, 
Cape Verde, Croatia, Finland, Lithuania and Poland. In other countries, the 
presidency has rather more powers and is the main focus of political life, even 
though the prime minister remains a significant actor. These countries include 
France, Senegal, Taiwan and, since the 2003 constitutional reform, Sao Tome and 
Principe. Whatever the situation, many of these countries have experienced 
periods of cohabitation. The classic example is France where power shifts 
abruptly from the president to the prime minister. More usually, though, 
cohabitation creates the situation where both the president and the prime 
minister compete for shared power. This has occurred in Lithuania, Mongolia, 
Poland, Romania, Sao Tome e Principe and briefly in Taiwan. And yet, 
democracy in these countries has survived. In short, the basic conclusion to be 
drawn from this overview is that balanced semi-presidentialism is not 
necessarily problematic, even for nascent democracies and even when there are 
periods of political cohabitation. More generally, it is certainly the case that the 
record of balanced semi-presidentialism is much better than the record of highly 
presidentialised semi-presidential systems. 
At first glance, therefore, the basic expectation of Linz and others about 
balanced semi-presidentialism would seem to be confounded. This form of 
government can work, even under difficult periods of political cohabitation. In 
these cases, though, the real question to ask is whether the countries in question 
have consolidated despite the presence of this type of semi-presidentialism and its 
political consequences. In other words, and for whatever reason, have these 
countries overcome the potential problems of balanced semi-presidentialism that 
Linz and others identify? Even if they have performed well in democratic terms, 
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have they done so for idiosyncratic and/or non-institutional reasons that might 
not be present elsewhere? If this is the case, then we should only recommend that 
a balanced form of semi-presidentialism be introduced when we are absolutely 
sure that it will not compromise the democratic foundations of the regime. In 
practice, this means that we would only recommend balanced semi-
presidentialism in cases where countries are already consolidated. We would be 
unlikely to recommend it for countries that are beginning the process of 
democratization. The risk would be too great. 
If we ask the question this way, then Linz’s basic judgment receives more 
support. As noted above, balanced semi-presidentialism creates the potential for 
intra-executive conflict, whether or not this conflict takes place between members 
of the same party or opposing parties. In a number of cases, such conflict has 
been destabilizing. For example, Steven Fish reports that in 1998 Mongolia 
“endured a months-long stint in political purgatory” as the president rejected a 
series of candidates for prime minister proposed by the opposition party in the 
legislature.xx Thus, even though Fish is supportive of semi-presidentialism in the 
Mongolian case, he acknowledges that the semi-presidential system was directly 
responsible for the ongoing governmental crisis. A similar situation occurred in 
Poland during the early years of democratization. There were ongoing struggles 
between President Walesa and successive prime ministers. Significantly for the 
purposes of this article, it has been argued that President Walesa “did not want 
to be a passive figurehead but intended to play an active role in shaping policy. 
He tried to influence his yet to be defined constitutional prerogatives by setting 
precedents which he hoped would be accepted as political custom”.xxi In so 
doing, Walesa came into conflict with his prime ministers who were trying to 
exercise their own constitutional powers. Needless to say, democracy has 
survived in both the Mongolian and Polish cases. However, it is difficult to argue 
that semi-presidentialism helped the situation in these countries at this time. 
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Thus, democracy may have survived despite the semi-presidential nature of the 
system. 
Indeed, if we examine the experience of countries that are not Free but 
that are Electoral Democracies, then this point is reinforced. In Niger, Sri Lanka 
and Ukraine, institutional conflict has been a decisive feature of the semi-
presidential system and, arguably, has been a real cause of the failure to achieve 
full democratic consolidation. For example, Moestrup has argued that in 1995 
Niger faced a particularly difficult period of political cohabitation between 
President Ousmane and Prime Minister Amadou.xxii For a year there was 
political deadlock, which in the end was only broken when General Mainassara 
Baré assumed power as the Chairman of the National Salvation Council. In other 
words, one of Linz’s predictions about balanced semi-presidentialism was totally 
accurate. The military stepped in to resolve the political gridlock. More recently, 
another of his predictions was extremely close to coming true in the case of 
Ukraine. Over the years, there have been ongoing periods of intense intra-
executive conflict between the president and the prime minister. This situation 
was frustrating for presidents who wanted to wield more authority and so 
sought more power. By the same token, though, Protsyk argues that when prime 
ministers assumed office they immediately achieved the status of a 
présidentiable.xxiii Thus, the rivalry was always institutional, sometimes party 
political and often highly personal. Again, it would be too simplistic to suggest 
that the system of balanced semi-presidentialism was the only cause of the 
problems in this case. However, the institutional framework created a situation 
in which both the president and prime minister were encouraged to seek more 
power and, ultimately, the democratic process was compromised at least until 
the dramatic events of the Orange Revolution in November-December 2004. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that some of the more dire 
pronouncements about balanced semi-presidentialism may be exaggerated. 
There are plenty of such countries that have established themselves as Free 
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democracies. Thus, in comparison with the highly presidentialised form of semi-
presidentialism, balanced semi-presidentialism should be classed as a 
constitutional choice that has a better-than-average chance of success. Even so, it 
is clear that semi-presidentialism is almost invariably associated with intra-
executive conflict and often with intra-executive conflict between actors from 
opposing political groups. The evidence from recently democratized countries 
suggests that such conflict is not insurmountable. It may lead to an acute political 
trauma, but it is not always democratically terminal. However, whether nascent 
democracies should choose balanced semi-presidentialism in the almost certain 
knowledge that they are going to face periods of potentially destabilizing intra-
executive conflict and perhaps sooner rather than later is a moot point. On 
balance, unless there is some reason to believe that a country will endure such 
conflict, then it is perhaps best avoided. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has tried to add to our understanding of the concept of semi-
presidentialism. Up to this point there has been a considerable degree of 
variation in how the concept has been defined and, more importantly, how it has 
been operationalised. By adopting a minimal definition of term, the aim was to 
reduce the level of subjectivity in the process of identifying semi-presidential 
countries and so increase the opportunities for comparing this form of 
government with other forms, most notably presidentialism and 
parliamentarism. More specifically, given the variety of practice in semi-
presidential regimes, this article has also tried to determine whether some forms 
of semi-presidentialism are more conducive to democracy than others. Part of the 
answer to this question is unequivocal. With some notable exceptions, the 
experience of highly presidentialised semi-presidential countries has tended to 
be negative, while the experience of parliamentary-like semi-presidential regimes 
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with ceremonial presidents and strong prime ministers has tended to be positive. 
Thus, democratizing countries can be encouraged to adopt the latter type of 
system so long as the president is truly just a figurehead. For example, the 
Slovenian and Irish presidents have scarcely any powers whatsoever. In the Irish 
case, this is at least one of the reasons why the presidential election is sometimes 
uncontested. Parties may not wish to bear the financial cost of an election and/or 
risk upsetting their legislative election strategy by running a poor campaign, 
especially when there is a popular incumbent who is seeking re-election. So, if 
there is a strong desire for a person to be able to speak on behalf of the country 
on the basis of some popular legitimacy and without any risk of creating a 
political crisis, then a semi-presidential regime with a ceremonial president is a 
good option. 
 The situation with regard to balanced semi-presidentialism is more 
equivocal. There are some very successful countries of this sort. Indeed, 
countries, like Portugal, have navigated potentially problematic democratization 
processes with such a system, while others, like Cape Verde and Sao Tome e 
Principe, have been able to confound the experience of most of their geographical 
neighbours on the basis of such a system. Thus, balanced semi-presidentialism 
can work. However, it is a risky choice. There is an inherent problem of intra-
executive conflict, including political cohabitation, built into such systems. In 
France, cohabitation first occurred in 1986 when the system was unequivocally 
consolidated. As a result, it posed no threat to the regime. That said, it was 
traumatic for the political class and in 2000 a constitutional amendment was 
passed that shortened the president’s term of office to five years, thus reducing 
(albeit not eliminating) the likelihood of cohabitation in the future. In other 
countries cohabitation has occurred when the system has been more fragile. In 
plenty of cases, including Mongolia and Poland, the problems of intra-executive 
conflict have been overcome and the democracy has survived. In other cases, a 
different outcome has occurred. In Niger the military stepped in to end the 
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period of cohabitation. In Ukraine the authoritarian drift of the country was only 
stopped by a remarkable show of peaceful popular dissent. Given this evidence, 
Linz, Valenzuela and Lijphart are probably right when they warn against this 
form of government. Overall, therefore, we can give a resounding two cheers for 
semi-presidentialism. 
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Table 1 Semi-presidential countries and democratic performance based 
on the 2004 Freedom House Survey 
 
Semi-presidential 
countries classed as Free 
by Freedom House 
Semi-presidential 
countries that are not 
classified as Free but are 
Electoral Democracies 
Partly Free and Not Free 
semi-presidential 
countries that are not 
Electoral Democracies 
Austria 
Bulgaria 
Cape Verde 
Croatia 
Finland 
France 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Lithuania 
Mali 
Mongolia 
Namibia 
Peru 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Sao Tome e Principe 
Senegal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
South Korea 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Russia 
Sri Lanka 
Timor Leste 
Ukraine 
 
Algeria 
Angola 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Burkina Faso 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Gabon 
Guinea-Bissau 
Haiti 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Mauritania 
Rwanda 
Singapore 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tunisia 
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Taiwan Uzbekistan 
Yemen 
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